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The Intra-household Division of Labor –
An Empirical Analysis of Spousal Inﬂ  uences
on Individual Time Allocation
Abstract
Regarding total working hours, including both paid and unpaid labor, hardly any 
diﬀ  erences between German men and women exist. However, whereas men allocate 
most of their time to market work, women still do most of the non-market work. 
Using the German Time Use Surveys 1991/92 and 2001/02, this paper aims to analyze 
the interactions between the time use decisions of partners within one household. 
Thereby, an interdependent model of the partners’ times allocated to paid and unpaid 
work that allows for simultaneity and endogeneity of the time allocation decisions of 
the spouses is applied. The results suggest that male time in market and non-market 
work is unaﬀ  ected by their wife’s time use, while women adjust their time alloca-
tion to the time schedule of their partner. These ﬁ  ndings might partly explain why in 
Germany – and other European countries as well – gender diﬀ  erences in employment 
and wages still persist.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: J16, J22, C34
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In terms of their total daily workload, including both market and non-market work, hardly
any diﬀerences between German men and women exist. However, whereas men perform most
of the paid work, women still do most of the unpaid work (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003).
According to Becker’s theory of the allocation of time (Becker, 1965), such a specialization of
the partners within one household is eﬃcient, as private households represent economic insti-
tutions that maximize their utility by optimizing the members’ time allocation to market and
household production. Hence, the household’s decision about its members’ times in paid and
unpaid work is deﬁned taking the relative productivity of the household members into account,
i.e. the partner that can oﬀer a higher potential income specializes in market work, whereas
the partner with a lower potential income specializes in non-market work.1
Although such a specialization might be eﬃcient for the household as a whole, the partner
who specializes in non-market work will be disadvantaged against the other in terms of future
labor market opportunities. In most instances it will be the wife who specializes in housework
and childcare, while the husband concentrates on market work. While withdrawing from the
labor market and specializing in housework, the wife’s marketable human capital stays constant
or even decreases, so that her chances to get back to the labor market are reduced. Hence, this
traditional division of labor between partners may serve as an explanation for remaining diﬀer-
ences in labor market opportunities and wages between men and women. The consequences of
such a specializations of the partners with women withdrawing from the labor market become
even more serious if the household breaks apart at any time, necessitating that the wife makes
a living from being gainfully employed. Thus, it might be one of the reasons why women are
aﬀected by old-age poverty more than men are. As divorce rates have increased considerably
during the last decades and are still on a high level today, solving this problem might be of
high relevance for Germany in the following years.
Using the German Time Use Surveys 1991/92 and 2001/02, this paper analyzes the deter-
minants having an impact on the way partners within one household share their work between
each other. Whereas the bulk of the existing research on the division of labor within couple
households focuses on the eﬀect of wages on time allocation, the aim of this analysis is to
shed light on the interrelations between the time uses of the partners, i.e. it is analyzed how
one spouse’s time spend in paid and unpaid work respectively is aﬀected by his partner’s times
spend in these activities. While – due to the time budget constraint – an individual’s amount of
time dedicated to paid and unpaid work is assumed to be negatively correlated with each other,
1Due to the assumption of the household maximizing one utility function, which implies that the members of
the household are driven by pure altruism within their families, Becker’s theory has been liable to considerable
criticism (see among others Chiappori, 1988; McElroy and Horney, 1981).
4the way the partners’ times are interacted is ambiguous. On the one hand, in the presence of
assortative mating in regard to preferences for market and non-market work respectively, the
partners’ times spend in market and non-market work constitute complements. Furthermore, if
the partners derive utility from spending time together, they will adapt their time schedules to
each other, also resulting in a positive correlation between the time allocations of the partners.
On the other hand, the spouses’ times in paid and unpaid work could constitute substitutes,
which would be in line with Becker’s theory of a specialization of partners within the household.
To address the problems of simultaneity and endogeneity of the partners’ time use decisions,
a structural interdependent model of the spouses’ time allocation to market and non-market
work is applied, whose parameters are estimated via instrumental variables. The validity of
these instruments is then tested by applying over-identiﬁcation tests to all of the time use
equations. While the problem of left-truncation in time use data is mostly solved by estimating
a Tobit model, I follow a diﬀerent approach. Since the consistency of the Tobit model rests
on the assumption that an individual’s decision of whether to participate in an activity is de-
termined by the same mechanism that determines the amount of time spent with this activity,
conditional on participation, a dubble-hurdle model proposed by Cragg (1971) is applied here
instead. This model allows both outcomes to be determined by diﬀerent processes and therefore
relaxes the strong assumptions of the Tobit model. The results suggest that the amount of time
men allocate to market and non-market work is unaﬀected by their wife’s time use. Women, in
contrast, adjust their employment hours to the time schedule of their partner: The more time
her husband spends with non-market work, the less time the wife spends with non-market work
and the more time she spends with market work.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the existing
evidence on intra-household time allocation. In section 3, the method used in the empirical
analysis is described. The underlying data are presented in section 4, along with a descriptive
analysis of German couples’ time allocation. Estimation results are discussed in section 5, and
section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In recent years, intra-household time allocation and in particular the division of labor between
partners within a household has become subject of a growing strand of theoretical as well
as empirical literature. The bulk of the empirical time use research focuses on wage eﬀects,
i.e. it is analyzed whether own and spouses’ wages do have an impact on the partners’ time
allocation (cf. Hersch and Stratton, 1994; Kalenkoski et al., 2006; Bloemen and Stancanelli,
2008). Thereby, the partners’ wages serve as a proxy for the individuals’ relative bargaining
5power within the household, following modern economic theories that model intra-household
time allocation as the outcome of a bargaining process between the partners.
However, relatively little is known about the interrelations between the time allocations of
the partners or more precisely, the reactions of the individual’s time use on changes in the
time allocation of the partner. An exception is Connelly and Kimmel (2007), who analyze the
eﬀect of spouse’s characteristics on active leisure time, childcare time, and home production
time for a sample of married couples with young children drawn from the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS). Using out-of-sample-predictions to address the problem of missing spousal in-
formation in the data and endogeneity of the parters’ time uses, they ﬁnd that on weekdays,
mothers whose husbands have more leisure time also have more leisure time. At the weekend,
however, a negative correlation between husband’s and wife’s leisure time exists. Furthermore,
the authors ﬁnd that on weekdays, fathers spend more minutes in caregiving when their wife
works more hours in the market. Accordingly, fathers engaging in childcare can relieve their
wifes by decreasing her minutes spend on caregiving. Husbands’ time spend on housework, in
contrast, increases their wives’ time in the same activity, but this eﬀect is only signiﬁcant for
weekend days. Using alternative ways to address the problem of missing spousal information
(in-sample-prediction, matching approach), the authors ﬁnd hardly any eﬀects of spousal fac-
tors on the the partners’ time use choices.
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2008) estimate the impact of wages on the time allocation to paid
work, childcare, and housework of French parents, allowing the errors of these equations to
be correlated with each other. Estimates of these correlations reveal a negative correlation in
unobservables between husband’s time in paid and unpaid work as well as between wife’s time
in these activities. This indicates the existence of unobservable characteristics that either select
individuals into market or into non-market activities. In contrast, a positive correlation between
fathers’ and mothers’ time dedicated to paid work as well as between their times dedicated to
housework is found, which is explained by assortative mating in regard to high preferences for
market or non-market work of both spouses. The unobservables in the wife’s paid work equa-
tion are also positively correlated with the unobservables in the husband’s childcare equation,
suggesting that wives whose husband has an unobserved preference for caregiving are able to
enlarge their times dedicated to market activities.
Deding and Lausten (2006) are the ﬁrst to explain intra-household time allocation by in-
cluding the partners’ times in market and non-market work as explanatory variables in the
individuals’ time use equations. For a sample of Danish couples they investigate the interrela-
tions between the partners’ time allocated to paid and unpaid work. To address the problem of
endogeneity of the partners’ time uses, Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares is applied. The
6authors ﬁnd a positive correlation between the spouses’ times in unpaid work, again supporting
the assortative mating theory. Furthermore, male time in paid work (unpaid work) is found to
increase female time in unpaid work (paid work), while men’s time allocation is unaﬀected be
the time use of their partner. However, to identify the time use equations, strong assumptions
regarding the exclusion restrictions on each of the equations have to be made. Among other
things, the authors assume that the presence and number of children do only aﬀect the partners
time allocation to non-market work, but not their time spend in market work. At least in case
of female time allocation, this assumption is debatable.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The question of main interested is, how one partner’s time in one activity is aﬀected by changes
in his own time in another activity (were these activities are paid and unpaid work respectively)
and – even more interesting – his partner’s times in these activities. Hence, the individual’s level
of time in a given activity is expected to be a function of his own as well as his partner’s time
use. Due to the time budget constraint of 24 hours per day, an individual’s time spent with one
activity is highly correlated with his time spent with another activity. Within the household
correlations between the time-use equations may arise from unobserved household speciﬁc corre-
lations in preferences (i.e. positive assortative mating in regard to a high preference for market
or non-market work of both spouses) or productivity (i.e. individuals who are productive in the
labor market might also be productive in the household, or the opposite might be the case).
Moreover, some work to be done within the household (e.g. doing the laundry) can only be
carried out once, either by the man or by the woman, leading to a correlation of the time uses of
the partners. By estimating the time use equations simultaneously, we allow the times spent on
diﬀerent work activities to be interdependent, both for the individual and between the partners.
A special feature of time use data is that a large fraction of zero values for the time spend
on some activities is observed.2 Hence, the partner’ times spend in the respective activities
are truncated at a value of zero. Taking these features into account results in a system of four
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2As can be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix, 11% of the men and 21% of the women do not spend any time
with market work on the survey day, although excluding weekend days frome the sample. For unpaid work, the









(i =1 ,...,N;j = m,f;k = p,u) (1b)
where t∗
ijk is the latent number of minutes spent on activity k (that is paid or unpaid work) by
household member j (that is male or female) in household i (i =1 ,...,N). The actual observed
minutes tijk will equal t∗
ijk if t∗
ijk is non-negative and zero otherwise. xi and zijk represent vectors
of explanatory variables included in all equations and equation-speciﬁc variables respectively.
 ijk is the error term.
The coeﬃcients of basic interest are αjk1, αjk2, αjk3 and αjk4. They represent how an indi-
viduals time spent in activity k is aﬀected by changes in its own time in the opposite activity





ifu on the right hand side of equations (1) are not exogenously
determined, but themselves choice variables. In order to identify causal eﬀects of changes in
the partners’ time use, we need to search for exogenous variations in the partner’s times in paid
and unpaid work. The problem of ﬁnding such instruments will be discussed in more detail later.
In order to estimate simultaneous-equation models with limited dependent variables and
endogenous regressors, diﬀerent methods have been proposed; see Amemiya (1978, 1979),
Heckman (1978), Smith and Blundell (1986) and – for a discussion of the asymptotic rela-
tive eﬃciency of these estimators – Blundell and Smith (1989). Here, a two-stage procedure
developed by Nelson and Olson (1978) is applied. The advantage of this method is that it is
relatively simple to implement. Nevertheless, estimates obtained by this method are consistent
and asymptotic normal. The procedure is as follows.





























































(i =1 ,...,N;j = m,f;k = p,u) (2b)
Equations (2) are estimated by applying maximum likelihood estimates to each of the four
equations separately. From the estimates for π 
jk and δ , ﬁtted values ˆ t∗
imp, ˆ t∗
ifp, ˆ t∗
imu and ˆ t∗
ifu
8are calculated. Thereafter, the t∗
ijk on the right hand side of equations (1a) are replaced by
the corresponding ˆ t∗
ijk. Estimators of the structural parameters in equation (1) are then ob-
tained by again applying maximum likelihood estimates to each of the four equations separately.
The predominant approach to address the problem of left-truncation is to estimate a To-
bit model (e.g. Kalenkoski et al., 2006; Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2008). The Tobit model is
motivated by assuming that individuals have preferred latent (positive or negative) amounts
of time that they would like to spend on some activities, which are observed if they are non-
negative but censored at a value of zero otherwise. However, in the case of time-diary data this
argumentation might not be appropriate. Observing zero minutes to be spend on an activity
does not necessarily imply that the individual does not spent any time on this activity at all.
Some activities might be done at some days but not on others. Hence, zeros arise because
the reference period of the data is shorter than the period of interest. Using simulated data,
Stewart (2009) shows that in such a case Tobit estimates are biased. One of the main reasons
for this result might be that the Tobit model assumes that an individual’s decision of whether
to participate in an activity is determined by the same mechanism that determines the amount
of time spend with this activity, conditional on participation. If this assumption is violated,
estimates from the Tobit model will be biased and inconsistent.
As an alternative to the Tobit model, Cragg (1971) proposed a two-part model. This model,
which is often referred to as a “double-hurdle model”, integrates the probit model to determine




























where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and wijk is a binary indicator
that equals 1 if tijk > 0 and 0 otherwise. x1ijk and x2ijk are vectors of explanatory variables
determining the probability of spending time in an activity and the amount of time spend in
this activity, given that tijk > 0, respectively. By allowing both outcomes to be determined
by separate processes (the vectors ρ 
jk and θ 
jk, respectively), Cragg’s model relaxes the strong
assumptions of the Tobit model and is therefore applied to estimate the parameters of equations
(1) and (2).
As mentioned above, identiﬁcation of the four structural equations requires exclusion re-
strictions on each of the equations. That is, to estimate the coeﬃcients of the equations for the
partners’ times in paid work consistently, one has to ﬁnd variables that aﬀect the individual’s
time in paid work, but do not aﬀect his time in unpaid work through any other channel than
9through his time in paid work. Similarly, to estimate the equations for the partners’ times in
unpaid work consistently, one has to ﬁnd variables that aﬀect the individual’s time in unpaid
work directly, but his time in paid work only indirectly via the time spent on paid work. At
this point it is worth noting that a structural form is only estimated for the second part of the
dubble-hurdle model, since interest is directed towards the interrelations between the partners’
time allocations for those who actually allocate time to these activities. For the selection equa-
tions, the unrestricted reduced form (2) is estimated instead.
The assumptions made regarding the exclusion restrictions on the structural equations are as
follows: In order to identify the paid work equations, I assumed that the housing characteristics,
i.e. the ownership of the house/ﬂat the couple is living in, the existence of a dishwasher/dryer,
the use of external help (domestic help, nanny, handcrafter etc.), whether additional persons are
living within the household, and the distance to the nearest grocery store aﬀect the partners’
times in unpaid work, but do not have a direct impact on their times in paid work. Additionally,
male time in paid work is assumed to be unaﬀected by the number and age of the children, while
this doesn’t hold true for female employment hours.3 Likewise, in order to identify the unpaid
work equations, I assumed that some job characteristics such as the individual’s occupation,
the commuting time to and from the workplace as well as the day of the week (Friday or not),
do not have a direct impact on the partners’ times in unpaid work. Moreover, the spouses’
time dedicated to non-market work was assumed to be uncorrelated with their working time
regulations, i.e. indicators on whether they are doing shift work or have ﬁxed work schedules.
Identiﬁcation of the structural equations requires at least as much instruments as endogenous
regressors included in each of the four equations. Since the vectors zimp, zifp, zimu and zifu
each consist of more than three elements, all of our four equations are over-identiﬁed. This
allows for applying a test for over-identifying restrictions and thus validating the assumptions
made regarding the exclusion restrictions. As Hoxby and Paserman (1998) show, standard
over-identiﬁcation tests statistics are biased in the presence of clustered data. To address this
problem, a heteroscedasticity-robust variant of the Hausman test (cf. Wooldridge, 2002) is
applied.
3When comparing the time allocation of employed couples with and without children, it becomes obvious
that compared to childless women, mothers work signiﬁcantly less hours in the market, while male working
hours are not aﬀected by parenthood.
104 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 The German Time Use Surveys 1991/92 and 2001/02
The following analysis is based on the German Time Use Surveys (GTUS) that were conducted
by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce in 1991/92 and 2001/02. Both surveys were carried out in
the context of representative quota samples of all private households in Germany. The GTUS
1991/92 was conducted in 7,200 households that were interviewed between autumn 1991 and
summer 1992. Information was collected on the time use of all household members aged 12
years and older, who were asked to describe the routine of the day in 5-minute intervals on two
subsequent days. A total of 32,000 diary days were collected. The GTUS 2001/02 covers about
5,400 households who were interviewed between April 2001 and March 2002. All household
members aged 10 years and older had to ﬁll in three time diaries – two on working days and
one on Saturday or Sunday – in order to describe the routine of the day in 10-minute inter-
vals. Altogether, information about 37,700 diary days exists. Despite these methodological
diﬀerences between the surveys both data sets are comparable to each other.4 One distinctive
feature that has to be noted here concerns the deﬁnition of childcare time. Whereas in the
1991/92-sample time spent with children under the age of 16 is deﬁned as childcare time, in
the 2001/02-sample time with children under the age of 18 is included. However, as it could
be assumed that the time-intensity of children in that age is very small, this diﬀerence should
not have an impact on the estimation results.
The advantage of the German time use data, as compared to other time use surveys (e.g.
the ATUS), is that both partners’ time uses and individual characteristics can be observed.
Moreover, the information is very detailed. About 200 diﬀerent activities can be distinguished
and in addition to main activities, secondary activities as well as persons who are present and
means of transport have been surveyed. However, in the following analysis main activities have
been included only.
The following analysis aims to shed light on the connection between the partners’ times
allocated to paid and unpaid work. These time uses are deﬁned as follows: Paid work includes
time dedicated to main and secondary employment, work breaks as well as commuting time
to and from the workplace. Furthermore, times for on-the-job training and job seeking are in-
cluded. In the literature, unpaid work is usually deﬁned according to the third-person-criterion
(Reid, 1934), i.e. it includes all unpaid tasks that could in principle be delegated to a third
person. We follow this categorization. Unpaid work consists of housework (preparing meals,
cleaning/keeping up house and yard, doing the laundry, gardening, caring for pets, doing main-
tenance and repair, shopping, making use of external services, managing the household, travel
4A comparison of the GTUS 1991/91 and the GTUS 2001/02 can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix.
11time in connection with these activities) and childcare (feeding the child, bathing the child,
educating the child, playing/doing sports with the child, talking to the child, reading to the
child, travel time in connection with child-related activities).5 Analyzing the connection be-
tween paid and unpaid work of partners consequently means not including time spent sleeping
and leisure time in the analysis.
The sample considered in the following analysis consists of married and cohabiting couples
living within one household that were selected according to the following criteria:
– both spouses are aged between 18 and 64 years, i.e. they are of working age
– both spouses are employed (full-/part-time)
– both spouses had ﬁlled in the time diary on the same day
– both spouses had ﬁlled in the time diary on a normal day6
– the household does not contain adult persons in need of care
As interest is directed towards the connection between the partners’ times in paid and unpaid
work, weekdays (Monday till Friday) are included only.7 Further excluding individuals with
missing information on at least one of the variables used in the empirical analysis leads to a
sample of 2,952 couples and 5,301 diary days.
4.2 Variables
In the empirical analysis several household and individual characteristics are controlled for.
Since there are no theoretical arguments to suggest that some factors do either solely aﬀect
the probability to engage in paid or unpaid work or solely aﬀect the amount of time allocated
to these activities, the variables included in the ﬁrst and the second part of the dubble-hurdle
model are the same. On the household level, dummy variables for the region the couple is living
in (East vs. West Germany), the sample period (1991/92 vs. 2001/02) and an interaction of
5Some authors argue that the utility associated with childcare is diﬀerent from the utility generated by
ordinary housework and thus the two have to be analyzed separately (see e.g. Deding and Lausten, 2006;
Kimmel and Connelly, 2007). I would have followed this approach, but for lack of instruments solely aﬀecting
housework and childcare respectively, in this analysis both tasks had to be combined.
6As individuals themselves had to decide whether the day is a normal or a non-normal day, an exclusion
of non-normal days is debatable. Therefore, the same analysis has been carried out including all diary days.
However, the results didn’t change signiﬁcantly, thus they are not presented here.
7It is worth noting that this might result in underestimating male non-market work, since men tend to
do relatively more household and childcare tasks on weekends. However, since time pressure is much higher
during the week compared to the weekend, because many of the non-market tasks cannot be postponed until
the weekend (e.g. taking the children to school, preparing meals etc. ), but have to be done at ﬁxed times of
the week, main interest is directed towards the interrelations of the partners’ time uses during the week.
12both are included. Additionally, the household income, the couples’ marital status (cohabiting
or married), the number of children, and the age of the youngest child are controlled for. On
the individual level, the age of the partners, their schooling and vocational education (4 and 6
dummies, respectively), and their net hourly wages are controlled for.
Concerning the income information, some remarks are necessary. First, information on
monthly net earnings was collected both as a continuous variable and in intervals, for respon-
dents who did not provide continuous earnings information. For them, earnings are set equal
to the mid-point of each interval, and to the lower bound of the top interval. Second, earnings
information was collected in Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1991/92 (1 euro equals 1,95583 DM) and
in euros in 2001/02. Even if converting the 1991/92-earnings into euros, both measures are
not comparable to each other, due to inﬂation and a considerable growth in wages over this
period. In addition, this wage growth was much more pronounced in East compared to West
Germany (Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer, 2008)). I address this problem by interacting the earnings
variable with the dummy for the sample period.8 Third, the direction of causality between an
individual’s earnings and its time allocation (especially its allocation of time to market work) is
not clear cut. On the one hand, the partners’ relative earnings could serve as a proxy for their
bargaining power within the household and therefore aﬀect the division of paid and unpaid work
between the spouses. On the other hand, an individual’s working time has a direct impact on
its earnings, so that a reverse causation between earnings and working time exists. A common
way to address this problem is replacing actual wages by predicted wages and using the latter
as control variables in the regression. As information on standard wage predictors is scarce
in the data (primarily, information on the working experience of the individuals is missing),
predicting the partner’s wages was not possible. However, as hourly wages, i.e. monthly net
earnings divided by usual working hours, instead of monthly wages are included, the problem
of reverse causality should be of minor relevance here.
In addition, instruments for the partners’ times spent in paid and unpaid work are included
in the regressions. As instruments for the unpaid work equations, dummy variables indicating
the ownership of the house/ﬂat the couple is living in, the existence of a dishwasher/dryer, the
use of external help (domestic help, nanny, handcrafter etc.), whether additional persons are
living within the household as well as a variable containing the distance to the nearest grocery
store are included. As mentioned in Section 3, the number and the age of the children serve
as additional instruments for male time dedicated to unpaid work, while they could not be
approved to be valid instruments for female time in unpaid work. To identify the paid work
equations, dummies for the spouses’ occupation, their working time regulations (indicating
whether they have ﬁxed work schedules or shift work), the day of the week (Friday or not) and
8As both aspects also apply to the information on household income, the same was done for this variable.
13a variable containing the individuals’ commuting time to and from the workplace are included
as instruments. Descriptive statistics of these variables are given in Table A3 in the Appendix.
4.3 Couples’s Time Allocation
Figure 1 shows the daily minutes men and women allocate to paid and unpaid work as well as
the total daily workload of the partners. In all cases, individuals spending non-zero minutes in
the respective activity are included only. In 1991/92, West German men spend about 9 hours
and West German women about 6 hours in paid work on an average working day. Ten years
later, the diﬀerence between the sexes becomes smaller, since women increased their working
hours (by about half an hour), while men’s working hours stayed almost constant. In East
Germany, both men and especially women do work longer hours in the market and the division
of market work between the sexes is much more equal compared to West Germans. From the
1990s to 2001, both men and women slightly decreased their working hours (by about 20 min-
utes for men and 15 minutes for women), but the ratio between the sexes stays almost constant.
The ﬁnding of East German women working considerably more hours in the market compared
to West German women is not surprisingly and can be explained by the East Germans’ institu-
tional background prior to German reuniﬁcation. In the former German Democratic Republic,
almost all women had been full time employed, thus still today female (full-time) employment
is much more usual in East Germany compared to West Germany.
< Figure 1 about here >
Regarding the partners’ times in unpaid work in West Germany in the 1990s, one can see
that with an average workload of 5.5 hours per day, women do the bulk of the couples’ house-
hold work, while men spend less than 2 and a half hours. In 2001/02, the diﬀerence between
the sexes becomes smaller, but this is mainly due to women having reduced their time in non-
market work, while men’s time in non-market work increased only slightly. Compared to West
Germany, the division of unpaid labor between the sexes is more equal in East Germany, with
men spending about 2.5 and women about 4.5 hours in non-market work. From 1991 to 2001,
both men and women in East Germany reduced their time in unpaid work. But similar to
the allocation of time to paid work, the female share of time in unpaid work stayed almost
constant. In sum, both East and West German couples decreased their time in unpaid work
over one decade, a fact that may partly be explained by technological progress, i.e. the increas-
ing utilization of home appliances like dishwashers, microwaves etc. or the rise in demands on
external home help.
The total working time of the couple is higher in the Eastern part of Germany, where men
and women spend about 21 hours with paid or unpaid work per weekday, compared to 19.5
14hours for West German couples. However, although East and West German couples diﬀer in
their intra-household allocation of time to market and non-market work, the total workload
of the household is shared equally between the partners in both parts of the country. This
goes against the widely held belief that – with an increase in female participation in the labor
market – women have to bear a double burden of both being employed and being responsible
for the household (and – if present – for the children).9
Despite these diﬀerences in the time allocation of the four subsamples, the following em-
pirical analysis is conducted for the sample as a whole. For a separate analysis, the number
of observations, especially in the East German sample, would have been too small. To allow
for diﬀerences in the time allocation of East and West German couples and changes over time,
dummy variables for the region, the sample period as well as an interaction between the two
have been included in the regression.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Reduced form estimates
Table 1 shows the estimation results of the reduced form equations (2) for the partners’ times
spend with paid work. Marginal eﬀects of the probit regression in the ﬁrst part of the dubble-
hurdle model are included in columns 1 and 3 along with their standard errors. For men,
hardly any variables show a signiﬁcant impact on the probability of spending any time with
employment on the survey day. In contrast, womens’ employment probability is highly aﬀected
by the number and age of her children. Moreover, the probability of spending time with mar-
ket work decreases by womens’ age, probably reﬂecting that younger women are more likely
to work full-time compared to older ones. Lastly, womens’ employment probability is aﬀected
by their vocational education and increasing with their wage rate. The results indicate that
the reason for not spending any time with employment on the survey day diﬀers by gender.
Observing a woman to spend zero minutes with market work might most likely be due to the
woman working part-time and being observed on a non-working day. For men, a clear-cut
reason for not working on the survey day cannot be found, since almost all men are full-time
employed (only 3% of the men declared to work part-time, compared to 46% of the women).
These results support the importance of applying an econometric speciﬁcation that allows the
decision of spending time with employment and the minutes of time spend with employment
conditional on participation to be determined by diﬀerent factors.
9However, it should be kept in mind that main activities are considered only. If women (or men) are more
likely to do working tasks simultaneously, their total workload will be underestimated.
15< Table 1 about here >
The results of the second part of the dubble-hurdle model for male and female minutes spend
with market work are shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1. As expected, the couples’ house-
hold income is positively correlated with both partners’ working hours. Moreover, cohabiting
women spend signiﬁcantly more minutes in market work compared to those being married. On
the individual level, both partners’ employment hours are found to decrease by age. Moreover,
men’s employment hours vary by their vocational education. While female working hours are
signiﬁcantly decreasing with the number and presence of small children, mens’ working hours
are not aﬀected by children. Regarding the eﬀects of the instruments used in the paid work
equations, doing shift-work is found to increase female employment hours. Furthermore, female
blue-collar workers and women being self-employed work less minutes in the markets compared
to white collar workers. In contrast to women, men being self-employed work longer hours
in the market, while the opposite is true for civil servants. Compared to other days of the
week, both men and women spend less minutes with employment on Fridays and their working
time increases by the distance to the workplace. Joint signiﬁcance of the instruments can be
conﬁrmed by the corresponding F-tests (values 39.55 and 18.73 for male and female working
time respectively).
The results of the reduced form equations for male and female time spend with unpaid work
are shown in Table 2. Since the proportion of women not spending any time with non-market
work on the survey day is very low (less than 1%), the ﬁrst-step probit model could only be
estimated for men. For them, the probability of spending time with unpaid work is increasing
with the presence of small children in the household. Moreover, self-employed are less likely to
engage in non-market work compared to white collar workers.
< Table 2 about here >
Regarding the results of the second-part of the dubble-hurdle model (columns 2 and 4),
the truncated regressions for the partners’ minutes spend in unpaid work, cohabiting women
are found to spend signiﬁcantly less minutes in non-market work compared to those married.
Together with the positive eﬀect of cohabitation on female employment hours, this ﬁnding is
contrary to Becker’s theory of marriage (Becker, 1973, 1974). According to him, marriage leads
to a specialization of two spouses within a household, in a way that the partner with the higher
earnings potential (which will in most instances be the man) specializes in market work, while
the one with the lower earnings potential specializes in housework. However, since the propor-
tion of couples being married is increasing by the age of the partners, this might partly reﬂect a
generational eﬀect, with older couples having a more traditional division of labor compared to
16younger ones. This ﬁnding is supported by the fact that female non-market hours are increasing
by age. Moreover, both spouses’ time spend with unpaid work is highly aﬀected by the number
and age of their children. From the other instruments, living in an owner-occupied dwelling
is found to have a signiﬁcant positive impact on both partners’ time spend with unpaid work.
Male time in non-market work is further increasing with the distance to the nearest grocery
store. While having a dishwasher is reducing male time in non-market work, it is increasing fe-
male time in non-market work (both eﬀects are signiﬁcant at a 10-percent level only). Whereas
toweling the dishes seems to be a typical male task, (un-)loading the dishwasher seems to be
a female task. Moreover, women’s time in unpaid work is signiﬁcantly higher in households
containing additional persons, which might be older people, e.g. the partners’ parents, that
are cared for. Regarding the results of the F-tests for joint signiﬁcance of the instruments,
instrument weakness can be ruled out for the female equation, while the value of 8.9 for the
male equation is slightly below the critical threshold of F = 10 for power in IV models.
By and large, the estimation results of the determinants of the partners’ times allocated to
market and non-market work conﬁrm those expected by theoretical consideration and found in
previous studies.
5.2 Structural form estimates
Full structural form estimates for the partners’ times allocated to paid and unpaid work can
be found in Table A4. Since the reduced instead of the structural form is estimated for the
selection equations, second-part results are reported only. The eﬀects of main interest – the
interdependencies between the time uses of the partners – are shown in Table 3.
< Table 3 about here >
Regarding male time in paid work, it becomes obvious that none of the coeﬃcients of the
endogenous regressors is signiﬁcant. Male time spent in market work is ﬁxed, i.e. men’s em-
ployment hours are neither aﬀected by their own time spent with non-market work, nor by
their wife’s time allocation (to market and non-market work). In contrast, female time in paid
work is highly aﬀected by her partner’s time allocation: The more time the men dedicates to
market work, the more time the women dedicates to market work as well. This could be an
indicator for assortative mating being relevant in this context, in a way that individuals with
a high preference for market work select themselves together. Moreover, it is consistent with
the ﬁnding of Hamermesh (2002), who provides evidence that couples attempt to synchronize
their work schedules in order to increase their joint leisure time. Female time in paid work is
further increasing by male time allocated to unpaid work. Thus, men who engage in household
and childcare tasks can take some time pressure oﬀ from their wife, who on her part is able to
17increase her employment hours. Since for employees time pressure is considerably higher during
weekdays compared to the weekend, this eﬀect might partly be driven by restricting the analysis
to weekdays. Lastly, the wife’s own time allocated to non-market work is signiﬁcantly reducing
her time allocated to market work, which is merely a consequence of the time budget constraint.
The results for the partners’ times spend with unpaid work show that mens’ time allocation
is unaﬀected by the time allocation of their partner. In contrast, female time dedicated to non-
market work is found to be negatively aﬀected by her partners’ time in paid and unpaid work.
Hence, womens’ non-market workload is highly depending on the support by their partner. As
expected, for both partners their own time in market work has a signiﬁcant negative impact on
their time in non-market work.
As mentioned above, the unbiasedness of the estimation results critically relies on the va-
lidity of the exclusion restrictions. The p-values of the respective χ2-tests on over-identifying
restrictions range from 0.36 for female time in paid work to 0.92 for male time in paid work.
Hence, for all equations the null-hypothesis of valid exclusion restrictions can’t be rejected and
we can be conﬁdent about the validity of the instruments. For comparison, Table A5 shows the
estimation results for the the interdependencies between the time uses of the partners apply-
ing a Tobit model instead of the double-hurdle model. The results are similar to those of the
dubble-hurdle model, except for male time dedicated to market work, which is now signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by female time allocated to market and non-market work. However, as the consistency
of the Tobit estimates critically rests on the assumption that an individual’s decision of whether
to participate in an activity is determined by the same mechanism that determines the amount
of time spent with this activity, these results are at risk of being biased.
In sum the results help us getting an idea of the couples’ decision making process regarding
the division of labor between the partners. It seems that in the ﬁrst instance, the male partner
determines his time allocated to market work. Consequently, the more time he spends with
market work, the less time he spends with non-market work. Male non-market time, on the
other hand, determines the amount of time the wife spends with unpaid work. Finally, on
the basis of the amount of time left, the decision about her working hours is made. The
interdependency between women’s non-market and market hours might be particularly strong
for couples with (small) children, as in most cases childcare tasks (such as feeding/dressing
the children, taking them to the kindergarten and to the school respectively etc.) have to
be done at ﬁxed times of the day. Dividing non-market work into housework and childcare
and analyzing both tasks separately may provide some further insights into the couples’ time
allocation decisions. However, due to the lack of instruments solely aﬀecting housework and
childcare respectively, analyzing both tasks separately wasn’t possible here.
186 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the intra-household division of labor of German
couples, more precisely, the interactions between the time allocations of the partners within
one household. It contributes to the existing literature by employing a structural interdepen-
dent model of the spouses’ time allocation to market and non-market work, that allows for
simultaneity and endogeneity of the time uses of the partners. For estimation, a dubble-hurdle
model proposed by Cragg (1971) is applied, that allows the probability of spending time in an
activity and the amount of time spend in this activity, conditional on participation to be de-
termined by separate processes and therefore relaxes the strong assumptions of the Tobit model.
The major ﬁnding is that men’s time allocation to paid and unpaid work is unaﬀected by
their wives’ time allocation, while women adjust their working hours to the time allocation of
their partner. This ﬁnding suggests that within the household, men can avail themselves of a
“ﬁrst mover advantage”, i.e. they decide about their amount of time dedicated to market and
non-market work ﬁrst. On the basis of male time allocation, which constitutes a ﬁxed parame-
ter in the female time allocation decision, women in turn choose their optimal amount of time
dedicated to market and non-market work. Thereby, the more their husband supports them
in the ﬁeld of non-market work, the more time and eﬀort they are able to invest in market work.
Although the widely spread belief of women’s total workload exceeding that of men’s if
both partners are employed doesn’t prove true for the case of Germany, German women still
bear a double burden of being responsible for household and children and being active in the
labor market. The amount of time being left for the latter thereby substantially depends on
the domestic support of her partner. This ﬁnding might provide a further explanation for still
persisting gender diﬀerences in respect of wages and promotion prospects in Germany. On the
one hand, employers may assume women to be less productive in the labor market and therefore
be more likely to hire or promote men instead. On the other hand, women themselves may seek
lower payed or less promising jobs that are characterized by a higher ﬂexibility in scheduling
and therefore compatible with their responsibility for household and children.
It is obvious that the division of labor of German spouses would become more equal if
men increased their engagement in non-market work, which would raise their wife’s amount
of time disposable for market work. However, as policy makers cannot aﬀect intra-household
time allocation directly, they should at least aim for providing a working environment that
oﬀers a maximum of ﬂexibility. This includes regulations regarding working time ﬂexibilities,
parental leave regulations as well as the provision of childcare services, which would lower the
opportunity costs of market work for women. However, evidence also suggests that within the
last decade, the division of labor between men and women has become much more equal in
19(West) Germany. If this trend persists, gender diﬀerences in labor market prospects and wages
may be diminishing.
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Table 1: Reduced form estimates – Paid work
Male Female
P(t>0) E(t|t>0) P(t>0) E(t|t>0)
Exogenous regressors:
Constant 1.225∗∗∗ 541.133∗∗∗ 1.691∗∗∗ 437.705∗∗∗
(0.29) (24.43) (0.23) (29.87)
East Germany 0.031 19.329∗∗ 0.031 81.784∗∗∗
(0.02) (9.84) (0.03) (10.81)
Wave 1991/92 0.107∗∗∗ 37.895∗ −0.061 −7.419
(0.04) (19.65) (0.05) (23.03)
East Germany*Wave 1991/92 −0.041 −1.582 0.119∗∗∗ 46.362∗∗∗
(0.03) (12.17) (0.04) (14.40)
Cohabiting 0.019 0.369 0.045 37.317∗∗∗
(0.02) (11.74) (0.04) (11.77)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)0 .004 10.900∗∗ −0.005 15.490∗∗∗
(0.01) (4.98) (0.01) (5.42)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)*Wave 1991/92 0.003 15.230∗∗ 0.028∗ 16.556∗∗
(0.01) (6.48) (0.02) (7.43)
Age −0.001 −1.098∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −1.922∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.47)
Net hourly wages (in ¤)0 .000 −0.050 0.001∗∗ 0.101∗
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
Net hourly wages (in ¤)*Wave 1991/92 −0.003∗∗ −5.598∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −7.173∗∗∗
(0.00) (1.14) (0.00) (1.50)
Schooling (ref.: lower school degree)
No degree/other degree 0.000 3.835 −0.021 1.488
(0.01) (6.01) (0.02) (8.40)
Degree for professional college 0.007 −14.965 −0.034 12.659
(0.02) (10.80) (0.03) (13.68)
High school degree −0.002 −10.069 −0.042∗ −9.020
(0.02) (10.25) (0.02) (10.52)
Vocational education (ref.: apprenticeship )
No education −0.040 −9.476 −0.010 −10.302
(0.03) (15.77) (0.03) (15.43)
Master school −0.040∗∗∗ 17.810∗∗ 0.033 13.389
(0.01) (7.05) (0.04) (18.57)
University of applied science degree 0.003 20.702∗ 0.085∗∗ 18.744
(0.02) (10.85) (0.03) (11.96)
University degree 0.012 2.672 0.131∗∗∗ 15.068
(0.02) (12.22) (0.03) (13.69)
Other educational degree −0.026 24.045∗∗ 0.036 13.945
(0.03) (11.10) (0.03) (9.76)
To be continued on next page
24Table 1: Reduced form estimates – Paid work (continued)
Male Female
P(t>0) E(t|t>0) P(t>0) E(t|t>0)
Instruments:
No. of children −0.000 2.006 −0.027∗∗∗ −30.271∗∗∗
(0.01) (2.65) (0.01) (3.53)
Youngest child < 3 years −0.027 −4.591 −0.239∗∗∗ −77.499∗∗∗
(0.02) (10.04) (0.03) (16.85)
Youngest child >= 3 and < 6 years 0.019 −13.273∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −49.492∗∗∗
(0.02) (7.71) (0.02) (9.58)
Additional persons living in the household 0.032 −24.892∗∗ 0.027 −49.354∗∗∗
(0.03) (11.74) (0.04) (16.05)
External help 0.021∗ −4.832 0.013 3.895
(0.01) (5.14) (0.02) (6.42)
House owner −0.002 13.181∗∗ 0.010 −16.491∗∗
(0.01) (5.29) (0.02) (6.72)
Dishwasher 0.012 −6.466 −0.042∗∗ −15.540∗
(0.01) (6.00) (0.02) (7.97)
Dryer 0.014 −6.260 0.023 4.519
(0.01) (5.32) (0.02) (6.66)
Distance grocery store (in minutes) −0.000 −0.058 0.000 0.109
(0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.17)
Fixed working hours −0.016 −3.358 0.017 8.276∗
(0.01) (5.17) (0.01) (4.40)
Shift work −0.040∗∗∗ −3.471 −0.025 19.518∗∗
(0.01) (6.83) (0.02) (9.72)
Occupation (ref.: white collar worker)
Self-employed 0.072∗∗∗ 19.444∗∗ 0.009 −30.344∗∗
(0.02) (8.37) (0.03) (13.26)
Civil servant −0.023 −36.559∗∗∗ −0.019 −3.027
(0.01) (6.73) (0.03) (11.15)
Blue collar worker −0.016 1.203 −0.049∗∗ −22.572∗∗
(0.01) (6.61) (0.02) (10.44)
Distance workplace (in minutes) −0.000 0.645∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.13)
Friday −0.027∗∗∗ −59.448∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −34.859∗∗∗
(0.01) (5.12) (0.01) (6.03)
F-statistic for joint signiﬁcance of instruments - 39.55 - 18.73
Observations 5,301 5,301
Non-zero observations 4,729 4,114
Notes: – Marginal eﬀects, with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
– Signiﬁcant at ∗∗∗: 1% level; ∗∗: 5% level; ∗: 10% level.
25Table 2: Reduced form estimates – Unpaid work
Male Female
P(t>0) E(t|t>0) P(t>0) E(t|t>0)
Exogenous regressors:
Constant 1.931∗∗∗ −399.197∗∗∗ - 147.016∗∗∗
(0.27) (150.42) (30.72)
East Germany −0.018 6.988 - −54.913∗∗∗
(0.02) (8.15) (11.14)
Wave 1991/92 −0.027 4.248 - 38.939∗∗
(0.03) (16.94) (18.16)
East Germany*Wave 1991/92 0.027 4.964 - −26.311∗
(0.02) (10.43) (13.97)
Cohabiting −0.007 −17.615 - −61.835∗∗∗
(0.02) (11.08) (14.65)
Household net income (in 1,000¤) −0.006 −1.415 - −14.646∗∗∗
(0.01) (4.38) (4.58)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)*Wave 1991/92 −0.005 −9.571∗ - −5.910
(0.01) (5.31) (5.84)
Age −0.001∗ 0.449 - 1.660∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.31) (0.41)
Net hourly wages (in ¤) −0.000∗∗ 0.075 - −0.091
(0.00) (0.14) (0.10)
Net hourly wages (in ¤)*Wave 1991/92 0.004∗∗ 0.476∗∗ -1 .695∗∗
(0.00) (0.19) (0.81)
Schooling (ref.: lower school degree)
No degree/other degree −0.021∗ 9.730∗ - −1.228
(0.01) (5.56) (6.85)
Degree for professional college 0.009 11.928 - 1.116
(0.02) (8.47) (11.38)
High school degree 0.031∗ 15.535∗ - −0.653
(0.02) (8.33) (8.75)
Vocational education (ref.: apprenticeship )
No education −0.018 −2.141 - −9.820
(0.03) (11.23) (10.81)
Master school −0.008 7.530 - −29.676∗∗
(0.01) (6.41) (13.07)
University of applied science degree −0.030 −15.150∗ - −32.391∗∗∗
(0.02) (8.66) (11.36)
University degree 0.008 −8.599 - −27.162∗∗
(0.02) (9.65) (12.23)
Other educational degree −0.015 −3.677 - −9.698
(0.02) (10.28) (8.99)
To be continued on next page
26Table 2: Reduced form estimates – Unpaid work (continued)
Male Female
P(t>0) E(t|t>0) P(t>0) E(t|t>0)
Instruments:
No. of children −0.004 5.062∗∗ -3 8 .368∗∗∗
(0.00) (2.25) (2.85)
Youngest child < 3 years 0.060∗∗∗ 36.112∗∗∗ - 142.836∗∗∗
(0.02) (7.19) (11.28)
Youngest child >= 3 and < 6 years 0.042∗∗∗ 16.204∗∗∗ -6 1 .961∗∗∗
(0.02) (6.07) (7.73)
Additional persons living in the household −0.010 14.172 - 42.869∗∗∗
(0.02) (10.75) (12.56)
External help 0.018∗ 0.709 - 0.320
(0.01) (4.62) (5.62)
House owner 0.004 7.492∗∗ -2 1 .189∗∗∗
(0.01) (3.31) (5.74)
Dishwasher −0.010 −4.786∗ -4 .152∗
(0.01) (2.62) (2.32)
Dryer −0.007 −3.627 - −2.200∗
(0.01) (4.72) (1.31)
Distance grocery store (in minutes) −0.000∗∗ 0.230∗∗ -0 .046
(0.00) (0.11) (0.16)
Fixed working hours 0.012 2.370 - −5.541
(0.01) (4.66) (5.29)
Shift work 0.020 23.701 - 0.108
(0.01) (15.29) (8.18)
Occupation (ref.: white collar worker)
Self-employed −0.069∗∗∗ −37.114∗∗∗ -1 9 .717∗∗
(0.01) (7.86) (9.40)
Civil servant 0.020 15.418∗∗∗ -7 .485
(0.01) (5.86) (9.98)
Blue collar worker 0.006 3.395 - 10.438
(0.01) (5.64) (8.23)
Distance workplace (in minutes) −0.000 −0.231∗∗∗ - −0.242∗∗
(0.00) (0.06) (0.09)
Friday 0.004 25.669∗∗∗ -2 0 .821∗∗∗
(0.01) (3.87) (5.13)
F-statistic for joint signiﬁcance of instruments - 8.92 - 13.13
Observations 5,301 5,301
Non-zero observations 4,799 5,252
Notes: – Marginal eﬀects, with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
– Signiﬁcant at ∗∗∗: 1% level; ∗∗: 5% level; ∗: 10% level.
27Table 3: Structural form estimates - Truncated regression
Paid work Unpaid work
male female male female
Male paid work 0.834∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.04) (0.10)
Female paid work 0.153∗ 0.030 −0.423∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Male unpaid work −0.312 1.493∗∗∗ −0.513∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.21) (0.18)
Female unpaid work 0.184 −1.371∗∗∗ −0.057
(0.12) (0.22) (0.15)
Observations 5,301 5,301 5,301 5,301
Non-zero observations 4,729 4,114 4,799 5,252
Overidentiﬁcation-test (p-value) 0.92 0.36 0.66 0.50
Notes: – Marginal eﬀects, with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
– Signiﬁcant at ∗∗∗: 1% level; ∗∗: 5% level; ∗: 10% level.
– Full estimation results are shown in table A4 in the Appendix.
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Table A1: Partners’ time allocation to paid and unpaid work
Average Percentage Average minu-
minutes of zeros tes if t>0
Male paid work 496.77 0.11 556.86
(219.77) (0.31) (143.78)
Female paid work 314.34 0.22 405.04
(227.98) (0.42) (173.86)
Male unpaid work 132.22 0.09 146.05
(127.85) (0.29) (126.63)
Female unpaid work 294.14 0.01 296.89
(169.78) (0.10) (168.16)
Table A2: German Time Use Surveys
1991/92 2001/02
Sampling method quota sample quota sample
Collection period autumn 1991 to
summer 1992
spring 2001 to spring
2002
No. of households 7,200 5,400
Age of household members
surveyed
12 years and older 10 years and older
No. of household members 16,000 12,600
No. of diaries per person 2 3
No. of activities 200 230
Childcare time included for children
under the age of 16
included for children
under the age of 18
Intervals 5-minute 10-minute
Details – main and secon-
dary activities
– main and secon-
dary activities
– means of transport – means of transport
– persons who are
present
– persons who are
present
29Table A3: Descriptive Statistics
Household level: mean sd
East Germany 0.27 (0.44)
Wave 1991/92 0.64 (0.48)
East Germany*Wave 1991/92 0.18 (0.39)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)2 .74 (1.09)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)*Wave 1991/92 1.53 (1.40)
Cohabiting 0.05 (0.21)
No. of children 1.35 (1.05)
Youngest child < 3 years 0.08 (0.27)
Youngest child >= 3 and < 6 years 0.13 (0.33)
Additional persons living in the household 0.04 (0.20)
House owner 0.62 (0.49)
External help 0.38 (0.49)
Dishwasher 0.65 (0.48)
Dryer 0.42 (0.49)
Distance grocery store (in minutes) 12.68 (17.50)
male female
Individual level: mean sd mean sd
Age 43.47 (8.48) 40.72 (8.25)
Net hourly wages (in ¤)1 0 .26 (16.27) 7.81 (23.17)
Net hourly wages (in ¤)*Wave 1991/92 5.80 (6.71) 3.91 (4.37)
Schooling
Lower school degree/other degree 0.37 (0.48) 0.26 (0.44)
Intermediary school degree 0.30 (0.46) 0.45 (0.50)
Degree for professional college 0.10 (0.29) 0.06 (0.24)
High school degree 0.24 (0.43) 0.22 (0.42)
Vocational education
No education 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.25)
Apprenticeship 0.49 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49)
Master school 0.16 (0.36) 0.05 (0.21)
University of applied science degree 0.12 (0.33) 0.08 (0.27)
University degree 0.16 (0.37) 0.11 (0.32)
Other educational degree 0.05 (0.21) 0.10 (0.30)
Occupation
Self-employed 0.17 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30)
Civil servant 0.18 (0.38) 0.09 (0.28)
Blue collar worker 0.32 (0.47) 0.12 (0.33)
White collar worker 0.32 (0.47) 0.69 (0.46)
Fixed working hours 0.40 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50)
Shift work 0.17 (0.38) 0.11 (0.32)
Distance workplace (in minutes) 42.23 (38.40) 37.34 (33.82)
Friday 13.72 (0.34) 13.72 (0.34)
Observations 2,952
30Table A4: Structural form estimates – Truncated regression (continuation of Table 3)
Paid work Unpaid work
male female male female
Exogenous regressors:
Constant 132.697∗∗∗ 146.814∗∗∗ 259.287∗∗∗ 163.128∗∗∗
(3.13) (2.69) (29.70) (3.00)
East Germany 18.508∗ −16.653 18.475∗∗ −10.393
(10.85) (16.00) (9.36) (12.67)
Wave 1991/92 40.186∗∗ −0.458 45.454∗∗ 46.390∗∗
(19.47) (24.78) (18.47) (19.82)
East Germany*Wave 1991/92 −6.063 −2.591 −7.114 8.764
(13.56) (16.08) (12.08) (16.19)
Cohabiting −4.732 −3.297 −17.684 −44.139∗∗∗
(12.29) (15.39) (12.12) (15.53)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)1 1 .843∗∗ −11.254∗ 2.718 −8.200∗
(4.89) (6.28) (4.59) (4.67)
Household net income (in 1,000¤)*Wave 1991/92 9.458 15.191∗∗ −8.035 −0.245
(6.47) (7.28) (5.45) (6.29)
Age −0.695∗∗ 1.293∗∗ −0.279 0.019
(0.32) (0.62) (0.34) (0.50)
Net hourly wages (in ¤) −0.082 0.007 0.086 −0.007
(0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10)
Net hourly wages (in ¤)*Wave 1991/92 −5.051∗∗∗ −4.876∗∗∗ −0.940∗∗ −0.858
(1.11) (1.45) (0.44) (0.96)
Schooling (ref.: lower school degree)
No degree/other degree 3.885 0.032 12.205∗∗ −3.987
(5.95) (8.25) (5.42) (6.85)
Degree for professional college −12.588 15.967 5.866 −0.003
(11.26) (13.64) (8.54) (11.31)
High school degree −5.859 −14.626 9.756 −9.690
(11.12) (10.39) (8.35) (8.90)
Vocational education (ref.: apprenticeship )
No education −14.740 −26.719∗ −17.629 −14.198
(15.79) (15.29) (11.41) (10.83)
Master school 20.176∗∗∗ −29.688 −0.300 −19.459
(7.20) (21.61) (6.43) (13.20)
University of applied science degree 16.432 −18.560 −9.790 −12.892
(11.79) (13.27) (8.44) (11.65)
University degree 0.796 −20.740 −9.833 −0.773
(12.26) (14.91) (9.57) (12.68)
Other educational degree 21.488∗ 0.759 −2.799 1.135
(11.30) (9.62) (10.28) (9.11)
To be continued on next page
31Table A4: Structural form estimates – Truncated regression (continued)
Paid work Unpaid work
male female male female
Instruments:
No. of children - 0.989 57.191∗∗ 39.169∗∗∗
(8.58) (25.86) (6.44)
Youngest child < 3 years - 63.430∗ 228.061∗∗ 136.117∗∗∗
(36.90) (95.40) (26.52)
Youngest child >= 3 and < 6 years - 3.667 120.152∗∗ 72.576∗∗∗
(17.95) (52.00) (14.93)
Additional persons living in the household - - 112.139 58.480∗∗∗
(74.44) (21.01)
External help - - 25.442 8.174
(26.33) (8.45)
House owner - - 81.891∗∗ 33.687∗∗∗
(35.07) (8.94)
Dishwasher - - −25.715 −3.963
(29.02) (10.10)
Dryer - - −1.365 8.691
(28.27) (8.29)
Distance grocery store (in minutes) - - 1.148∗ 0.305
(0.50) (0.24)
Fixed working hours −2.117 −0.367 - -
(5.30) (6.07)
Shift work 4.638 13.387 - -
(9.83) (9.55)
Occupation (ref.: white collar worker)
Self-employed 7.712 2.078 - -
(13.16) (14.28)
Civil servant −30.502∗∗∗ 10.510 - -
(8.04) (11.38)
Blue collar worker 4.923 −9.464 - -
(6.83) (10.41)
Distance workplace (in minutes) 0.564∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ --
(0.08) (0.14)
Friday −47.593∗∗∗ 9.283 - -
(8.65) (8.94)
Observations 5,301 5,301 5,301 5,301
Non-zero observations 4,729 4,114 4,799 5,252
Notes: – Marginal eﬀects, with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
– Signiﬁcant at ∗∗∗: 1% level; ∗∗: 5% level; ∗: 10% level.
32Table A5: Structural form estimates - Tobit regression
Paid work Unpaid work
male female male female
Male paid work 0.582∗∗ −0.560∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗
(0.25) (0.05) (0.10)
Female paid work 0.515∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.355∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.10) (0.08)
Male unpaid work −0.115 0.792∗∗ −0.540∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.34) (0.17)
Female unpaid work 0.553∗∗∗ −0.914∗∗ −0.235
(0.21) (0.37) (0.24)
Observations 5,301 5,301 5,301 5,301
Non-zero observations 4,729 4,114 4,799 5,252
Notes: – Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
– Signiﬁcant at ∗∗∗: 1% level; ∗∗: 5% level; ∗: 10% level.
– Control variables are same as in Table A4. Full estimation results are
available from the author upon request.
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